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Growing up, I heard stories about my great grandpa James 
Stanton, the son of Irish immigrants who was orphaned at a young age. 
James grew up in New York in the early 1900s and eventually made his 
way to Utah, where he met and married my great grandma. James rarely 
spoke about his parents, and for the longest time the only thing he told us 
is that they were Irish. When he died in 1968, that was essentially all we 
knew about them. My mother tried repeatedly to find James’ parents and 
complete our family tree but continuously ran into dead ends. It was a 
family history “cold case” for most of my life. Then, last year, my mother 
caught a break in the case and discovered that my Irish orphan great 
grandpa James Stanton was actually my Polish runaway great grandpa 
Joseph Balkum.  
While the revelation that James Stanton was actually Joseph 
Balkum sent shockwaves through my family, it did not garner national 
attention like the apprehension of the Golden State Killer. The Golden 
State Killer terrorized central and southern California in the 1970s and 80s 
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on a seemingly unstoppable criminal rampage.1 He is thought to be 
responsible for committing sixty home invasions, fifty rapes, and thirteen 
murders, making him one of America’s most prolific serial killers.2 While 
his crime spree ended in the 80s, the police never captured the Golden 
State Killer.3 The case remained unsolved until last year when police 
arrested Joseph James DeAngelo Jr. and charged him as the Golden State 
Killer.4 While it could be a few years before the trial even starts, 
prosecutors are confident that they have their man and say that they will 
seek the death penalty.5 
While both mysteries were solved last year, on the surface they 
have very little in common. What does the discovery of a long-lost grandpa 
and the revelation of the identity of notorious serial killer have in 
common? Both cold cases were solved using forensic genealogy.   
 
I. FORENSIC GENEALOGY 
Forensic Genealogy is the process of using DNA matches to 
reverse engineer a family tree.6 A DNA sample is submitted to a DNA 
database (e.g., 23andMe or Ancestry.com), resulting in various matches. 
Using those matches, “[f]amily trees are developed for individuals as close 
or closer than third or fourth cousins, with an eye to where disparate 
branches of the family trees cross, indicating a family where both paternal 
and maternal lines combine in a single family.”7 While the DNA match is 
                                                     
* J.D. Pepperdine University School of Law 2020 
1 Paige St. John, et. al, Mapping the Golden State Killer, L.A. TIMES 
(June 11, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/projects/man-in-the-window-crime-
map-golden-state-killer-serial/.  
2 Id.  
3 Breeana Hare & Christo Taoushiani, What we know about the Golden 
State Killer case, one year after a suspect was arrested, CNN, 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/24/us/golden-state-killer-one-year-
later/index.html (last updated Apr. 24, 2019). 
4 St. John, supra 1. 
5 Id. 
6 Colleen Fitzpatrick & Dee Dee King, Forensic Genealogy—Dead Men 
Do Tell Tales, RECORD CLICK PROFESSIONAL GENEALOGISTS, 
https://www.recordclick.com/forensic-genealogy-dead-men-do-tell-tales/ (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2020). 
7 RAY A. WICKENHEISER, Forensic Genealogy, Bioethics and the 
Golden State Killer Case, 1 FORENSIC SCIENCE INTERNATIONAL: SYNERGY 114, 
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the first step in forensic genealogy, there is more investigation that goes 
into it. After a match is found, investigators will use a variety of resources 
to complete the family tree. Common resources include “census records, 
vital records, newspaper archives, public ‘people search’ databases, public 
social media data, and public family trees.”8 If there are two potential DNA 
matches for a single sample, descendancy research is performed to trace 
the descendants of each set of ancestors to determine if an intersection 
between them can be found.9  
When my mother uploaded her DNA to Ancestry, her DNA 
matched with a second cousin, a woman she never heard of before. My 
mother reached out to her and through her own forensic genealogy 
discovered the truth about Joseph Balkum, alias James Stanton. Joseph 
Balkum ran away from home when he was fifteen after a fight with his 
mother. He changed his name and took this secret to his grave. Without 
DNA testing, my family would likely have never learned the truth about 
our heritage.  
Similarly, the Golden State Killer’s DNA was uploaded to 
GEDmatch—a public DNA database—resulting in a match to a potential 
a distant relative.10 Investigators then used traditional genealogical 
research methods to reverse engineer a family tree, leading them to Joseph 
DeAngelo.11 Once they suspected DeAngelo, police obtained a sample of 
his DNA from his discarded trash and compared it to suspect DNA left at 
one of the Golden State Killer’s crime scenes, resulting in a match.12 After 
decades of searching, forensic genealogy provided a break in the Golden 
State Killer case.  
                                                     
118 (July 12, 2019), 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2589871X19301342. 
8 ELLEN M. GREYTAK, et al., Genetic Genealogy for Cold Cases and 
Active Investigations, 299 FORENSIC SCIENCE INTERNATIONAL 103, 106 (Mar. 
27, 2019), 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0379073819301264.  
9 Id.  
10 Jocelyn Kaiser, New federal rules limit police searches of family tree 
DNA databases, SCI. MAG. (Sept. 25, 2019), 
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/09/new-federal-rules-limit-police-
searches-family-tree-dna-databases.  
11 Id.  
12 Breeanna Hare & Christo Taoushiani, What we know about the Golden 
State Killer Case, one year after a suspect was arrested, CNN (Apr. 24, 2019), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/24/us/golden-state-killer-one-year-
later/index.html. 
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While the use of DNA in criminal cases is nothing new, the 
increase in access to DNA analyses through Direct to Consumer genetic 
testing providers is changing the game. One study suggested that it is often 
possible to identify an unknown individual from a single third-cousin-
level match given knowledge of his or her sex, location within 100 miles, 
and age within five years.13 Another report claims that “[i]f you’re white, 
live in the United States, and a distant relative has uploaded their DNA to 
a public ancestry database, there’s a good chance an internet sleuth can 
identify you from a DNA sample you left somewhere.”14 A search like that 
could potentially identify about 60% of white Americans from a DNA 
sample.15 Yaniv Elrich, a computational geneticist at Columbia University 
says that, “in a few years, it’s really going to be everyone” that can be 
identified.16 
Forensic genealogy is still a fairly new and rare application 
gaining notoriety as its use in major crime cases increases. There has been 
a noticeable increase in the use of forensic genealogy as the popularity of 
direct-to-consumer genetic testing providers increased.17 While the 
technology that enabled forensic genealogy is impressive and no one is 
opposed to catching serial killers, there are still ethical concerns about the 
use of DNA and forensic genealogy.18 As Sacramento County District 
Attorney Ann Marie Schubert put it, “[i]t is probably one of the greatest 
revolutions, at least I would say, in my lifetime as a prosecutor . . . [b]ut it 
is a difficult, evolving topic because there are privacy interests at stake in 
an area that’s unregulated.”19  
 
                                                     
13 GREYTAK, supra note 8, at 108. 
14 JOCELYN KAISER, We will find you: DNA search used to nab Golden 
State Killer can home in on about 60% of white Americans, SCI. MAG. (Oct. 11, 
2018), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/10/we-will-find-you-dna-search-
used-nab-golden-state-killer-can-home-about-60-white. 
15 Id.  
16 Id. (quoting Yaniv Elrich).  
17 Paige St. John, DNA genealogical databases are a gold mine for 
police, but with few rules and little transparency, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2019), 
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-11-24/law-enforcement-dna-
crime-cases-privacy. 
18 Benjamin Berkman, The Questionable Ethics of Expanding Forensic 
DNA Testing, PAC. STANDARD (Mar. 21, 2019), http://www.psmag.com/ social-
justice/the-ethical-questions-about-expanded-dna-testing. 
19 St. John, supra 17 (quoting Ann Marie Schubert). 
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II. DIRECT TO CONSUMER DATABASES 
The U.S. National Library of Medicine defines Direct to 
Consumer (DTC) genetic testing as genetic tests that are marketed directly 
to customers.20 Customers send the company a DNA sample and receive 
their results directly from a secure website or in a written report, without 
involving a healthcare provider or health insurance company.21 Consumers 
can get information on diseases and health conditions to which they may 
be genetically predisposed, as well as information about their ancestry. 
These DTC genetic tests increased in popularity in the past few years, with 
the tests costing as little as $59.22  The two leading DTC providers are 
Ancestry of Lehi, Utah and 23andMe of Mountain View, California.23 
Two other popular DTC providers are FamilyTreeDNA (FTDNA) and 
MyHeritage.24  
 
A. Terms and Conditions 
With approximately 15 million DNA samples, Ancestry is the 
largest DTC provider.25 To use Ancestry, a consumer must be at least 18 
years old, although a parent with full legal custody may send in his or her 
child’s sample.26 A consumer submits a vial of saliva for a DNA test,25 
making it nearly impossible for someone to submit a third party’s DNA 
sample. Additionally, Ancestry requires “explicit consent” from the 
person providing the saliva sample.27  
Ancestry maintains a “you own your own data” approach to its 
services, which is one of the first things listed in its terms and conditions.28 
                                                     
20 U.S. Nat'l Libr. of Med., What is direct-to-consumer genetic testing?, 
GENETIC HOME REFERENCE (Nov. 26, 2019), 
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/dtcgenetictesting/directtoconsumer. 
21 Id.  
22 Antonio Regalado, More than 26 million people have taken an at-
home ancestry test, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 11, 2019), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612880/more-than-26-million-people-
have-taken-an-at-home-ancestry-test/. 
23 Id.  
24 Greytak, supra note 8, at 106.  
25 Id. 
26 Ancestry Terms and Conditions, ANCESTRY (July 25, 2019), 
https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/termsandconditions. 
25 Id.  
27 Id.  
28 Id.  
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Consumers grant the company the license to their data so Ancestry can 
provide products and services.29 At any time, consumers can request that 
their data be deleted, and Ancestry will comply.30 Ancestry will not share 
genetic data with employers, insurance providers, or third-party marketers 
without first obtaining consent.31 Ancestry’s privacy statement makes it 
clear that it will not voluntarily cooperate with law enforcement.32 If 
Ancestry is compelled to disclose a consumer’s personal information to 
law enforcement, it will do its best to provide the consumer with advanced 
notice, unless prohibited by law.33 In the interest of transparency, Ancestry 
also produces an annual transparency report where it lists the number of 
valid law enforcement requests it received for user data across its sites.34 
In 2008, Ancestry received ten valid law enforcement requests for user 
information and provided information in response to seven of those 
requests; all of these requests related to investigations of credit card 
misuse, fraud, and identity theft.35 Ancestry received no valid requests for 
genetic information of any Ancestry member and stated that it does not 
disclose such information to law enforcement.36 
23andMe has approximately ten million consumers.37 Like 
Ancestry, a consumer can only submit his or her own saliva sample or a 
sample for someone for which he or she has legal authority.38 23andMe 
has a guide for law enforcement on its site, in which it makes clear that 
“23andMe chooses to use all practical legal and administrative resources 
to resist requests from law enforcement, and we do not share customer data 
with any public databases, or with entities that may increase the risk of law 
                                                     
29 Eric Heath, Setting the Record Straight: Ancestry and Your DNA, 
ANCESTRY (May 21, 2017), 
https://blogs.ancestry.com/ancestry/2017/05/21/setting-the-record-straight-
ancestry-and-your-dna/.  
30 Id.  
31 Id.  
32 Your Privacy, ANCESTRY (July 25, 2019), 
https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/privacystatement.  
33 Id.  
34 Id.  
35 Ancestry 2018 Transparency Report, ANCESTRY, (last updated Mar. 
3, 2020), https://www.ancestry.com/cs/transparency. 
36 Id.  
37 Greytak, supra note 8, at 106. 
38 Terms of Service, 23ANDME (Sept. 30, 2019), 
https://www.23andme.com/about/tos/.  
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enforcement access.”39 However, it does add that, in certain 
circumstances, it may be required to comply with a valid court order, 
subpoena, or search warrant for genetic or personal information.40 
23andMe also periodically publishes a transparency report, which was last 
updated on October 15, 2019.41 As of this most recent update, 23andMe 
received seven government requests for data from ten specified users and 
produced zero data as a result of the requests.42 
FamilyTreeDNA has over a million DNA profiles on its site.43 
Every DNA test kit consists of two cotton swabs designed to be used by 
one individual.44 When a consumer sends in the cheek swabs, he or she 
must also send in a signed consent form.45 While FTDNA does not extract 
from forensic samples (like hair, toothbrushes, tissues, etc.), it will accept 
blood cards for extraction.46 Even though FTDNA advertises the fact that 
it cooperates with law enforcement, it still requires law enforcement 
officers to request to submit a sample or genetic file to the database.47 
Permission is only granted to identify the remains of a deceased individual 
or to identify a perpetrator of a homicide, sexual assault, or abduction.48 
While FTDNA does not currently have a transparency report, it is working 
towards publishing a transparency report “that contains details on all law 
enforcement requests for user information that we receive” as well as “the 
number of forensic samples and files we have received.”49 
Unlike the other three large DTC providers, MyHeritage operates 
in Europe.50 As of September 2018, MyHeritage DNA database had 
                                                     
39 23andMe Guide for Law Enforcement, 23ANDME, 
https://www.23andme.com/law-enforcement-guide/ (last updated Mar. 3, 2020).  
40 Id.  
41 Transparency Report, 23ANDME, 
https://www.23andme.com/transparency-report/ (last updated Mar. 3, 2020).  
42 Id.  
43  Salvador Hernandez, One of the Biggest At-Home DNA Testing 
Companies is Working With the FBI (Jan. 31, 2019), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/salvadorhernandez/family-tree-dna-fbi-
investigative-genealogy-privacy.  
44 DNA Test Kit Instructions, FAMILYTREEDNA, 
https://learn.familytreedna.com/testing-process/dna-test-kit-instructions/.  
45 Id.  
46 FamilyTreeDNA Learning Center, FAMILYTREEDNA, 
https://learn.familytreedna.com/ftdna/forensic-samples/.  
47 FamilyTreeDNA Law Enforcement Guide, FAMILYTREEDNA, 
https://www.familytreedna.com/legal/law-enforcement-guide. 
48 Id. 
49 Id.  
50 REGALADO, supra note 22.  
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approximately 1.75 million DNA users.51 For its DNA test, MyHeritage 
requires “a simple cheek swab (no blood or spit).”52 MyHeritage states that 
by submitting a sample, the consumer represents that the DNA sample is 
his or her own, or that of a person for whom the consumer is a legal 
guardian, or of a person for whom the consumer has obtained legal 
authorization to provide his or her DNA to MyHeritage.53 Additionally, its 
terms and conditions state that “using DNA Services for law enforcement 
purposes, forensic examinations, criminal investigations, ‘cold case’ 
investigations, identification of unknown deceased people, location of 
relatives of deceased people using cadaver DNA, and/or all similar 
purposes, is strictly prohibited, unless a court order is obtained.”54 
MyHeritage does not currently publish a transparency report.55  
 
B. Regulations 
The DTC market has been described as the “wild west” due to the 
current lack of regulations.56 For a brief period in 2010, it appeared that 
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) intended to regulate the 
DTC market when it notified a company that its genetic test kit “appeared 
to meet the definition of a medical device” under the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act, giving the FDA jurisdiction to regulate the kit.57 However, 
the FDA used its “enforcement discretion” and elected not to regulate the 
DTC genetic testing market used for ancestry purposes.58 Additionally, the 
                                                     
51 MyHeritage Has More Than 1.75 Million DNA Users!, 
THEDNAGEEK (Sept. 16, 2018) https://thednageek.com/myheritage-has-more-
than-1-75-million-dna-users/.  
52 How Does DNA Testing Work?, MYHERITAGE, 
https://www.myheritage.com/dna. 
53 My Heritage – Terms and Conditions, MYHERITAGE, (last viewed 
Dec. 1, 2019) https://www.myheritage.com/terms-and-conditions. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. (Showing that there is an omission of transparency report). 
56 Elizabeth E. Joh, DNA Theft: Recognizing the Crime of 
Nonconsensual Genetic Collection and Testing, 91 B.U. L. REV. 665, 675 
(2011). 
57 FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE: SCIENCE AND THE LAW § 13:15. 
58 See Joh, supra note 56; Direct-To-Consumer Tests, FDA, 
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/vitro-diagnostics/direct-consumer-tests. 
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Federal Trade Commission does not provide any regulation or oversight 
of laboratories that provide DTC genetic testing for ancestry purposes. 59 
The federal agency that is most directly responsible for regulating 
DTC tests is the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). The 
CMS enforces the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 
1988, a law that applies to all clinical laboratories providing testing 
services.60 However, CMS’s regulatory authority only addresses analytical 
validity, but not clinical validity.61  Analytical validity measures whether 
a lab performing a test reliably identifies the absence or presence of a 
certain genetic variation, whereas clinical validity refers to whether the 
genetic variant correlates with a specific disease or condition.62 While the 
discrepancy between analytical and clinical validity has no significant 
bearing on forensic genealogy, it does illustrate the lack of oversite into 
these DTC laboratories.  
While the FDA does not provide any serious regulation of DTC 
tests, it does provide information on the tests on its website.63 The FDA 
also makes it clear that no test is 100% accurate. While the FDA does not 
regulate ancestry tests, it granted market clearance to 23andMe for its 
various health screening options that it offers.64 
 
C. GEDmatch  
GEDmatch does not technically qualify as a DTC provider 
because consumers do not send their DNA samples directly into 
GEDmatch, but it still plays an active role in forensic genealogy. 
GEDmatch is a public platform where consumers can upload their DNA 
results that they obtained from other DTC providers to compare their 
results with other people.65 GEDmatch was crucial in the apprehension of 
the Golden State Killer. After the Golden State Killer suspect was 
identified through the use of GEDmatch, the site’s administration decided 
                                                     
59 See Joh, supra note 56 
60 Id.  
61 Id.  
62 Id.  
63 Direct-To-Consumer Tests, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/medical-
devices/vitro-diagnostics/direct-consumer-tests. 
64 Id.  
65 Tools for DNA and Genealogy Research, GEDMATCH, 
https://www.gedmatch.com/login1.php. 
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to explicitly allow law enforcement to use the site.66 In April of 2018, 
GEDmatch informed its users of the following:  
 
While the database was created for genealogical research, 
it is important that GEDmatch participants understand the 
possible use of their DNA, including identification of 
relatives that have committed crimes or were victims of 
crimes. If you are concerned about non-genealogical uses 
of your DNA, you should not upload your DNA to the 
database and/or you should remove DNA that has already 
been uploaded.67 
 
Following the arrest of the Golden State Killer and the 
announcement of its decision to fully cooperate with law enforcement, 
GEDmatch saw a significant increase in the number of participants on the 
site.68 Listed in bright red in its Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, 
consumers are informed that their DNA may be compared to “DNA 
obtained and authorized by law enforcement to identify a perpetrator of a 
violent crime against another individual, where ‘violent crime’ is defined 
as murder, nonnegligent manslaughter, aggravated rape, robbery, or 
aggravated assault; [Or] DNA obtained and authorized by law 
enforcement to identify remains of a deceased individual.”69 In addition to 
fully cooperating with law enforcement, GEDmatch partnered with 
Parabon, a company that is constantly comparing the DNA uploaded to 
GEDmatch to DNA provided by law enforcement officers trying to catch 
a break in their case.70 Parabon monitors all unsolved cases for new 
matches on a weekly basis.71  
 
                                                     
66 Greytak, supra note 8, at 106. 
67 Id.  
68 Id. at 107. 
69 Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, GEDMATCH (May 18, 2019), 
https://www.gedmatch.com/tos.htm. 
70 Greytak, supra note 8, at 107. 
71 Id. 
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III. A SUMMARY OF CRIMINAL CASES THAT HAVE USED 
DTC AND FORENSIC GENEALOGY  
While the Golden State Killer case garnered the most media 
attention, it is not the only case in recent years in which law enforcement 
officials used forensic genealogy and DTC databases in their 
investigations. Since that case, more than thirty rapists, killers, and 
victim’s bodies have been identified in the same way.72 Some sources 
reported up to sixty-six DNA-derived cases.73 These cases include the 
identification of the man who murdered eight-year-old April Tinsley in 
1988, and the “NorCal Rapist” who was active from 1991 through 2006.74 
The first conviction resulting from a case using forensic genealogy 
was in June of 2018 when Washington native William Earl Talbott was 
found guilty for the 1987 murder of a British Columbia couple.75 For over 
three decades, detectives investigated hundreds of leads but were unable 
to crack the case. In 2017, a Snohomish County Sheriff’s detective learned 
about Parabon Labs and the possibility of building a family tree that leads 
to a suspect.76 The suspect’s DNA from the crime scenes resulted in a 
match on GEDmatch with two unrelated second cousins.77 When family 
trees were developed based on these matches, Talbott was the only male 
carrier for the mix of DNA from the two families.78 DNA on a discarded 
paper cup from Talbott’s truck matched the DNA from the crime scene, 
leading to Talbott’s arrest.79 The arrest and subsequent conviction 
provided peace for the victims’ families, who say, “It feels great to have 
some of the answers. We don’t have all the answers, but we have a lot 
more than we had for 31 years.”80 
While many of the headlines surrounding forensic genealogy are 
about its effectiveness in catching killers, it has also been a source of 
exoneration. In July of 2019, an Idaho judge dismissed all charges against 
                                                     
72 Regalado, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..  
73 St. John, supra note 17.  
74 Greytak, supra note 8, at 104. 
75 SeaTac Man Convicted of 1987 Murders of Canadian Couple After 
DNA Evidence Linked Him to Case, SEATTLE TIMES (June 28, 2019, 3:58 PM), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/seatac-man-convicted-of-
1987-murders-of-canadian-couple-after-dna-evidence-linked-him-to-case/. 
76 Id.  
77 Id.  
78 Id.  
79 Id.  
80 Id.  
 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW VOL. XIII:II 
 
196
Christopher Tapp, a man wrongfully convicted in 1996 of the rape and 
murder of an 18-year-old.81 There had long been evidence that Tapp’s 
confession to the crimes was coerced, but when forensic genealogy 
confirmed that he was not the perpetrator, his name was cleared.82 
Interestingly enough, it was the persistence of the victim’s mother that was 
most instrumental. She insisted that a genetic genealogist analyze the DNA 
evidence in the case, finding a link to another man who confessed to the 
decades-old killing.83 While it is disheartening that Tapp was convicted 
after a coerced confession, this case does demonstrate that forensic 
genealogy has the potential to exonerate as well as convict.  
  
IV. ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS AND CONCERNS 
There are mixed reactions to the use of forensic genealogy in 
criminal cases, both in the public at large and in the genealogical 
community. Prominent genealogists had bitter disagreements over 
whether or not police should be able to use genealogical databases that 
resulted in groups on Facebook banning the discussion.84 At a genealogical 
conference in June of 2019, the different sides of the debate ignored each 
other from opposite ends of the bar, refusing to speak to or acknowledge 
one another.85 It is a complicated issue because catching murders and 
solving cold cases is something that is widely supported for obvious 
reasons. It can provide closure for families, as well as bring criminals to 
justice. However, there are opposing and competing interests: that of 
individual privacy and that of public safety. As one scholar puts it, “[T]o 
what extent can the rights of the innocent general public and relatives of 
the committer of a crime be infringed upon by interrogating their genetic 
data to identify the crime perpetrator and thereby prevent future crimes 
                                                     
81 Mia Armstrong, In an Apparent First, Genetic Genealogy Aids a 
Wrongful Conviction Case, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (July 17, 2019, 4:45 PM), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/07/16/in-an-apparent-first-genetic-
genealogy-aids-a-wrongful-conviction-case. 
82 Id.  
83 Id.  
84 Sarah Zhang, The Messy Consequences of the Golden State Killer 
Case, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 1, 2019), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2019/10/genetic-genealogy-dna-
database-criminal-investigations/599005/. 
85 Id.  
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and improve public safety?”86 Some of the biggest ethical concerns about 
forensic genealogy revolve around informed consent, the legal 
implications of the technology, and privacy concerns.   
 
A. Informed Consent 
Consumers often do not think of the potential implications and 
repercussions of submitting their DNA to a DTC provider, especially when 
they are doing so predominantly for ancestry purposes. For most people, 
this process is done for entertainment or sentimental reasons. As Benjamin 
Berkman, the head of ethics of genetics and new technologies at the 
National Institutes of Health’s Department of Bioethics, puts it, 
“Genealogy is typically done for entertainment purposes. . . . People may 
not realize uploading their DNA could be responsible for a cousin’s arrest 
as well.”87 While a consumer may readily check the “I have read the terms 
and conditions” box, that does not guarantee that they actually read the 
terms and conditions. Even if they did, they may not have understood to 
what they were consenting. “The terms of service agreements don’t 
explain clearly, and even if they did, people wouldn’t read it or find it in 
the dense legalese.”88 There was recently a woman in Washington state 
who learned after the fact that her DNA on GEDmatch led to the arrest of 
her second cousin twice removed, a man who she never met and did not 
know, for murder in Iowa.89 While she was initially unsure about how she 
felt, she now says, “I feel OK about it . . . I want someone to have to do 
time if [he/she] did something like that. I don’t regret it now.”90 
There are also issues regarding whether or not DNA donors to 
DTC providers actually consented to the analysis of their DNA. While 
most DTC providers claim that the DNA submitted to them must be done 
so with the DNA donors’ consent, including the four DTC providers 
discussed above, there is little done to actually regulate this. Currently, 
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DTC providers have no real incentive to check that the samples mailed to 
them legitimately belong to the consumer.91 A journalist at New Scientist 
found that “genome hacking” was relatively easy to conduct after he 
“collect[ed] his colleague’s saliva from a cup (with his consent).”92 He had 
“one company extract the DNA, [had] another amplify the sample to create 
enough DNA for analysis, and [had] yet another analyze the DNA for any 
medical predispositions.”93 The journalist “also successfully submitted a 
cheek swab with his colleague's DNA for analysis.”94 While none of the 
companies the journalist used to analyze his coworkers DNA were any of 
the above discussed DTC providers, they were all companies that claimed 
in their terms and conditions that customers submitting DNA for analysis 
had to have the legal authority to do so.95 However, none of them checked 
the journalist’s claim that the DNA submitted was his.96 If a consumer can 
get the required DNA samples for Ancestry, 23andMe, MyHeritage, or 
FTDNA, nothing is preventing him or her from submitting someone else’s 
DNA for analysis. It would be as easy as checking the right box or forging 
a signature to have someone else’s DNA analyzed through one of these 
providers.  
 
B. Legal Issues 
It is a well-established aspect of criminal law that law enforcement 
officers can use any technology in their investigations that is readily 
available to the public,97 so there is nothing specifically barring the use of 
forensic genealogy in criminal cases. However, in response to the outcry 
of concern since the Golden State Killer case, the United States 
Department of Justice (DOJ) released an interim policy on forensic genetic 
genealogical DNA analysis and searching.98 The policy was approved on 
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September 2, 2019, and went into effect on November 1, 2019.99 The 
Department of Justice stated that they are “committed to developing 
practices that protect reasonable interests in privacy, while allowing law 
enforcement to make effective use of FGGS [(forensic genetic 
genealogical DNA analysis and searching)] to help identify violent 
criminals, exonerate innocent suspects, and ensure the fair and impartial 
administration of justice to all Americans.”100 They also clarify that any 
personal genetic information that is used in this process is not transferred, 
retrieved, downloaded, or retained during the automated search and 
comparison process.101 None of the information or data derived from 
FGGS is uploaded or retained in the CODIS DNA Index, the government’s 
own DNA database.102 The policy clarifies that any information derived 
from genetic associations are only used as an investigative lead, and no 
suspect can be arrested based solely on a genetic association.103 Once a 
suspect is identified, the suspect’s DNA must be compared directly to the 
DNA sample from the original crime to confirm that the forensic sample 
could have originated from the suspect.104  
Case criteria are also set forth in the interim policy. Forensic 
genealogy may be used by investigative agencies when a case involves an 
unsolved violent crime (here defined as any homicide or sex crime) and 
the forensic sample is from the perpetrator, or if the case involves the 
unidentified remains of a suspected homicide victim.105 Additionally, 
prosecutors may authorize the use of forensic genealogy when there is a 
substantial and ongoing threat to public safety or national security.106 
Investigative agencies are now required to identify themselves as law 
enforcement when they are working with DTC genealogy services and can 
only work with DTC services that provide “explicit notice” to their users 
and the public that law enforcement may use their services.107 
The Department of Justice’s interim policy is a concrete step 
towards regulating forensic genealogy in criminal cases, but it only applies 
in four specific instances. The policy applies to (1) criminal investigations 
in which the Department of Justice has exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction 
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of the crime and lawful custody of the forensic samples; (2) any criminal 
investigation in which the DOJ provides funding to a federal, state, local, 
or tribal agency; (3) any criminal investigation in which DOJ employees 
or contractors conduct the genealogical research on leads generated 
through forensic genealogy; and (4) any federal agency or any unit of state, 
local, or tribal government that receives grants from the Department for 
the purpose of forensic genealogy.108 While these categories will naturally 
encompass many of the law enforcement officers and agencies that want 
to use forensic genealogy, there are still state and local law enforcement 
agencies that are exempt from these regulations.  
An interesting legal point to note is that if a suspect took issue 
with forensic genealogy database searching, that suspect would have no 
legal standing to bring a claim against the government because the only 
person who could bring a suit is the relative whose DNA is used.109 This 
could potentially be relevant in cases like that of an innocent twin thrown 
in jail in California for suspected rape.110 
 
C. Privacy Concerns  
Another concern surrounding forensic genealogy is about 
expectations of privacy and issues of abandoned property. Because people 
leave discarded DNA in a variety of forms, whether it is skin cells, hair 
follicles, saliva on cups, or other ways, it is comparable to discarded or 
abandoned property. In this way, it can be considered legally analogous to 
trash. The Supreme Court addressed this issue in California v. Greenwood, 
wherein it held that its “decisions concerning the scope of 
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule have balanced the benefits of 
deterring police misconduct against the costs of excluding reliable 
evidence of criminal activity.”111 This case was a result of law enforcement 
requesting that trash collectors retrieve a suspect’s garbage.112 After 
officers searched his garbage, they found evidence of narcotics use and 
arrested him.113 In its opinion, the Court also made it clear that for 
individuals to be protected by the Fourth Amendment, not only must they 
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have a legitimate expectation of privacy, but also society must “accept that 
expectation as objectively reasonable.”114 While the analysis in 
Greenwood may have seemed thorough and appropriate in 1988, the 
ability to analyze discarded DNA is beyond what many people could have 
imagined thirty years ago. Now people’s discarded trash can provide more 
than just details about how they live—it has the potential to provide 
incredibly personal and detailed genetic information.  
The Court in Greenwood makes it clear that states can legislate 
the issue further, and in May of 2019, Oregon did just that. In State v. Lien, 
the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled that the defendants had a 
constitutionally protected privacy interest in their garbage, even after the 
sanitation company manager retrieved it from a curbside bin and turned it 
over to the police.115 There are no facts that strongly differentiate Lien 
from Greenwood, other than the fact that Oregon decided to further 
legislate the issue of privacy rights in discarded material, like trash or 
genetic material. While this has the potential to extend protection and 
privacy rights to discarded genetic material, Oregon never explicitly 
discussed DNA, genetic privacy, or the potential implications of its ruling.  
There are also legitimate privacy concerns that, despite what they 
claim, there is nothing to keep DTCs from secretly cooperating with the 
police. As revealed by BuzzFeed in January of 2019, FamilyTreeDNA 
secretly worked with the FBI and allowed agents to search its vast 
database.116 This marked the first time a private firm agreed to voluntarily 
allow law enforcement access to its database.117 Despite FTDNA’s secret 
cooperation with the FBI, there has been virtually no repercussion, and 
FTDNA is now using cooperation with law enforcement as a marketing 
strategy.118 
 
V. MOVING FORWARD 
 Because using DTC DNA databases for forensic 
genealogy in criminal cases is fairly new, there are not many set guidelines 
regulating their use. While there have not been any serious negative side 
effects as of yet, it would be wise to take preventative measures to ensure 
that this technology is not abused.  
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A. Informed Consumer Consent and Company Transparency 
An important step towards resolving the ethical issues 
surrounding forensic genealogy is to encourage consumers to know in 
what they are getting. While this will happen naturally as more and more 
cases are solved using forensic genealogy and DTC databases, it is 
important to encourage consumer awareness now. While individual 
consumers have the responsibility to educate themselves, privacy 
advocacy groups could also consider social media campaigns, or ad 
campaigns to raise awareness. If someone decides to submit his or her 
DNA to a DTC provider, the U.S. National Library of Medicine provides 
a guide for consumers on how to assess a company’s privacy practice.119 
It recommends researching what the company does with the DNA sample 
once analysis is complete, determining who owns the genetic data, who 
the company will share the data with, whether or not a consumer can “opt 
out” of data sharing, and whether consumers will be notified in the future 
if the company changes its privacy policies.120  
Something that would go a long way towards reducing ethical 
concerns would be for every DTC provider with a DNA database to have 
an active “opt in” option to government searching. This way, consumers 
would be making an active choice to make their genetic information 
available for criminal investigations. Officials at FTDNA made it possible 
for consumers to opt out of familial matching, which prevents their 
profiles from being searchable by the FBI but simultaneously prevents 
them from finding possible relatives through DNA testing.121 Companies 
should make it possible for consumers to protect their genetic data from 
government investigations while still being able to be found by relatives. 
In May, GEDmatch revised its policy to an active “opt in,” where 
consumers had to actively agree to be included in any searches done by 
government agencies.122 This reduced the number of profiles police could 
search by 90%, from roughly 1.4 million to 140,000.123 While this 
                                                     
119 GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, How Do Direct-to-Consumer Genetic 
Testing Companies Protect Their Customer’s Privacy?, U.S. NAT’L LIBRARY OF 
MED. (Mar. 3, 2020), 
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/dtcgenetictesting/dtcprivacy.  
120 Id.  
121 Hernandez, supra note 43. 
122 Kaiser, supra note 10.  
123 Id.  
2020                           ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS 203
reduction has no doubt disappointed many investigators, it will more fully 
ensure that consumers know if their DNA is being used in investigations. 
This is an important step towards the balance between genetic privacy and 
public safety.   
Companies need to be better at ensuring the DNA they are testing 
has been sent in with consent. A requirement of written consent from the 
specific genetic donor could be a more feasible first step towards 
regulating the DTC market and a vital component of any proposed 
legislation. A suggested consent form should:  
 
inform the donor of the purpose and scope of testing; the 
length of time the sample and results will be retained; the 
potential corollary uses, if any, for which the donor's 
sample and results will be used; and identification of third 
parties that may conduct any testing or analysis of the 
sample or results. The form shall also include an “opt-
out” provision in which the donor may elect to have the 
sample and results destroyed upon completion of the 
stated purpose and scope of testing.124  
 
While a written consent form does not guarantee that someone 
cannot masquerade as the genetic donor and forge the donor’s signature, 
it provides a legitimate deterrence and is an active step on the part of the 
DTC provider to more fully ensure privacy and informed consumer 
consent.  
 
B. DNA Privacy Laws 
The only current federal legislation that governs genetic privacy 
is the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1966 
(“HIPAA”) and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 
(“GINA”). However, they are both limited in scope, and neither is 
applicable to DTC DNA testing.125 About half of the American states have 
laws that protect genetic privacy, but there is no level of consistency in 
those laws.126 In most American jurisdictions, the nonconsensual 
collection of human tissue for DNA analysis purposes is not a crime or 
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even a civil violation.127 While some states address it on a surface level, 
Alaska’s law is the most comprehensive. In Alaska, people are prohibited 
from “collect[ing] a DNA sample from a person, perform[ing] a DNA 
analysis on a sample, retain[ing] a DNA sample or the results of a DNA 
analysis, or disclos[ing] the results of a DNA analysis unless the person 
first obtained the informed and written consent of the person.”128 Alaska’s 
statute also states that DNA samples and the result of the DNA analysis 
are the exclusive property of the person sampled or analyzed.129  
A suggested change to DNA law is to make DNA theft a separate 
crime. Currently, the nonconsensual collection and analysis of another 
person’s DNA is virtually unrestrained by law.130 People shed genetic 
material on a daily basis in the form of hair, discarded tissues, used cups, 
and other ways. There is no preventing the loss of personal, genetic 
material. This becomes a problem when third parties retrieve this 
discarded genetic material for their own purposes. Police are not the only 
ones who may be interested in people’s genetic information. There are also 
concerns about political parties analyzing opposing party candidates’ 
DNA and professional sports teams analyzing athletes’ DNA; similarly, 
there are those who are interested in selling celebrity DNA information.131 
Under one proposed law, the offense of DNA theft would criminalize the 
nonconsensual DNA collection and analysis by third parties. Specifically, 
it would “prohibit (1) knowingly taking or storing another person’s bodily 
material (2) without consent (3) for the purpose of analyzing or disclosing 
the genetic information therein”.132 Other proponents of the introduction 
of some sort of DNA theft law point out that any legislation would need 
to account for familial relationships and shared genetic information. If 
legislation fails to take this in to account, “an individual would have no 
recourse against a family member that intentionally or mistakenly shares 
‘that person’s genetic secrets.’”133 Any legislation also needs to consider 
the inverse—that legislation could go too far and be too stringent, to the 
point that family members find themselves subject to criminal or civil 
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liability for releasing their own genetic information.134 Because of the 
inescapable shared nature of genetic information, it would be important 
for these issues to be thoroughly researched and carefully worded so as to 
not be too stringent but still be effective.  
The United Kingdom passed a law in 2006 that recognized DNA 
theft as a criminal offense.135 The Human Tissue Act defines the 
nonconsensual taking of another person’s bodily material for genetic 
analysis as a criminal offense, unless it is for an approved purpose (i.e. law 
enforcement purposes).136 Here, the absence of the tissue provider’s 
consent is a central component of the offense.137 If a person is found guilty 
of DNA theft, that person is subject to a fine, three years in prison, or 
both.138  
While making DNA theft a separate crime may not seem to 
directly correlate to DTC databases and forensic genealogy, it would 
implement another guard against people uploading others’ DNA to a DTC 
without their consent. The United States Federal Government could use 
the United Kingdom’s Human Tissue Act as a starting model to implement 
a law that would criminalize DNA theft. Or, states could start 
implementing a law that, at the very least, addresses DNA theft and makes 
it a civil violation, even if they do not go so far as to criminalize DNA 
theft. Additionally, criminalizing DNA theft and the nonconsensual 
collection and analysis of DNA provides motivation for DTC providers to 
ensure that the samples submitted to them are done so with legitimate 
consent. Adopting a DNA theft offense could also help lend some clarity 
to the appropriate Fourth Amendment characterization of genetic 
information that people shed. Specifically, “[t]he existence of a DNA theft 
offense expresses a social norm that genetic information, wherever it is 
found, retains individual privacy interests that deserve protection from 
theft.”139 
Another suggestion for regulation of DNA privacy, especially in 
relation to DTC providers, is to treat it similar to criminal justice 
databases. “A high level of structured policy and protection is placed on 
use of criminal justice databases, such that this could provide needed 
framework to genealogical searching rather than the laissez faire approach 
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apparent in the direct to consumer marketplace.”140 Safeguards would 
include only allowing specific authorized law enforcement individuals to 
access and use DTC databases, ensuring there are checks and balances for 
access, and strict use of the data that is accessed.141 
 
C. Case Selection Criteria 
Realistically, a strict case selection criterion is the preventative 
measure that is most likely to be implemented and approved. Currently, 
DTC databases have only been used to solve major crimes, such as serial 
killer cases and infamous cold cases. Case selection criteria should be set 
before the cases begin—that way, law enforcement officers cannot tailor 
the criteria to whatever case they are working on when they want to justify 
the use of forensic genealogy. Use of forensic genealogy should be limited 
to major crimes against a person with a public safety threat. Cases should 
be vetted to ensure traditional means of investigation have not succeeded. 
To qualify for genealogical searching, there must also be no match made 
to a suspect profile in NDIS as well as sufficient DNA for testing to yield 
an accurate search against public databases.142 
The limited application for cases of major crime is supported by 
public opinion, as evidenced by a survey conducted by bioethicists where 
79% of 1,587 individuals polled supported use in major crimes against the 
person of homicide and rape.143 The support for using forensic genealogy 
in cases of property crime was only 39%, whereas respondents were 80% 
in favor of using forensic genealogy in cases of violent crime.144  
Given the recent implementation of the interim guidelines on a 
federal level, this seems like the most probable immediate solution to the 
ethical debate surrounding the use of forensic genealogy in criminal 
investigation. One bioethicist from the Baylor College of Medicine in 
Houston predicts that the federal guidelines will become the national 
model because “[he] think[s] people are trying to do this right.”145 
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CONCLUSION  
The use of forensic genealogy to solve criminal cases is likely to 
increase in the coming years, especially given its success in solving cold 
cases. While its potential for good is impressive, there are also legitimate 
ethical concerns that need to be addressed. As society sees an increase in 
the use of forensic genealogy and DTC databases in criminal 
investigations as well as an increase in the media attention it garners, there 
will be more discussion regarding ethical implications. Legal scholars say 
that it is only a matter of time before courts weigh in on the privacy of 
DNA,146 and I predict that in the next few years, we will see an increase in 
cases and legislation regarding DTC providers and forensic genealogy. 
 
  
                                                     
146 St. John, supra note 17.  
 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW VOL. XIII:II 
 
208
 
